Abstract. This paper will propose a wolf attack probability (W AP ) as a new measure for evaluating security of biometric authentication systems. The wolf attack is an attempt to impersonate a victim by feeding "wolves" into the system to be attacked. The "wolf" means an input value which can be falsely accepted as a match with multiple templates. W AP is defined as a maximum success probability of the wolf attack with one wolf sample. In this paper, we give a rigorous definition of the new security measure which gives strengh estimation of an individual biometric authentication system against impersonation attacks. We show that if one reestimates using our W AP measure, a typical fingerprint algorithm is turned out to be much weaker than theoretically estimated by Ratha et al. Moreover, we apply the wolf attack to a finger-vein-pattern matching algorithm. Surprisingly, we show that there exists an extremely strong wolf which falsely matches all templates for any threshold values.
Introduction
A biometric authentication system automatically authenticates an individual by using physiological and/or behavioral characteristics. Recently, the use of biometric authentication systems has spread in various services such as the immigration control at an airport, financial transactions at an ATM (automated tellers machine) terminal, the access control for a mobile phone, and so on. This trend has made it more important to exactly evaluate the security of biometric authetication systems.
In order to conduct the security evaluation, it is necessary to identify threats and vulnerabilities regarding the biometrics. General threats and vulnerabilities common to biometric authentication systems have already been clarified in many literatures. The committee draft of ISO/IEC 19792 describes three threats and eleven vulnerabilities [1] . With regard to the threats, the draft includes "intentional impersonation," "unexpected high F AR (false acceptance rate)," and "creating backdoor." Focusing on the intentional impersonation, the following three attacks have been widely discussed so far: a brute-force attack, a zero-effort attack, and an artifact attack. The artifact attack is that an attacker presents the victim's biometric characteristic by using some artifacts [2] . Although a security measure against the zero-effort attack has been established as F AR, no measures are commonly accepted by the industry against the brute-force attack and the artifact attack.
With regard to the brute-force attack, Ratha et al. [3] estimates its success probability in a fingerprint-minutiae matching algorithm. We will call the success probability a "minutiae collision probability (M CP )." However, M CP of Ratha et al. is computed under the following condition: the attacker presents an input value that consists of the same number of minutiae as that of all templates to be compared with. Therefore, M CP of Ratha et al. does not give the exact success probability of the brute-force attack. In order to do so, we have to compute M CP in such a way to take all possible input values into account.
The brute-force attack is supposed to be carried out under the situation that an attacker blindly selects an input value to be presented to a biometric authentication system. However, if we assume that the attacker has some information on the internal algorithms employed in the system, we have to pay attention to an attack with a smarter choice of a sample, "wolf." The draft of ISO/IEC 19792 defines the wolf as a biometric sample that shows high similarity to most of the templates [1] . If the attacker successfully found the wolf, he could impersonate the victim with a higher probability than M CP by presenting the wolf.
In this paper, we call such an attack a "wolf attack," and propose a "wolf attack probability (W AP )" as a maximum success probability of the wolf attack with one wolf sample. W AP is considered to be the upper bound of the success probability of attacks that are carried out without knowledge of a victim's biometric sample. Therefore, W AP can be used as a security measure to evaluate the lower bound of a security level in an individual biometric authentication system.
We show that W AP is extremely larger than the theoretical estimation of M CP by Ratha et al. in the fingerprint-minutiae matching algorithm. Ratha et al. computed M CP under the condition that the number of minutiae in the input value N q is identical to that of minutiae in the template N r . Especially Moreover, we will apply the wolf attack to a finger-vein-pattern matching alorithm proposed by [4] . Surprisingly, we show that there exists the wolf which falsely matches any templates for any threshold values. Especially, we call such a wolf a "universal wolf." This result implies that it is necessary to evaluate an impact of the wolf attack on a matching algorithm by applying the wolf attack and obtaining W AP . This paper continues as follows. Section 2 will obtain exact M CP on the basis of [3] . By using M CP , we will search for an input value that maximizes the probability of a false match with a given template, and show that the maximized probability is extremely larger than M CP of Ratha et al. Section 3 will define the wolf attack and W AP . Section 4 will describe F AR and discuss its limitation as a security measure for the wolf attack. Section 5 will show a result of applying the wolf attack to the finger-vein-pattern matching alorithm proposed by [4] . Section 6 will summarize our results and show future research topics. Ratha et al. [3] discusses a typical fingerprint-minutiae matching algorithm in which the number of matched minutiae between an input value and a template reflects the degree of the match. The feature of a minutia consists of its location (x, y) and the ridge direction d. If the number of paired minutiae whose locations and ridge directions are equal to or more than a threshold value m, the input value is accepted as a match with the corresponding template.
In such a matching algorithm, Ratha et al. discussed the security level against the brute-force attack. Assuming that the attacker presents an input value consisting of forged minutiae whose locations and ridge directions are randomly selected, Ratha et al. attempted to compute the probability that the input value falsely matches a given template in both a location and a ridge direction. We call the probability a "minutiae collision probability (M CP )." In general, the definition of M CP is given as follows. 
P r[match(s, t) = accept]
(1)
where Pr [X] and Ave Y denote a probability of the occurrence of phenomenon X and a mean of Y , respectively.
In [3] , M CP is discussed under the condition of N q = N r . This condition means that the number of minutiae in the input value is identical to that of the template. As a result, M CP R , which denotes conditional M CP computed by Ratha et al., is defined as follows.
Definition 2. For a given
The difference between M CP and M CP R is whether the condition of N q = N r is applied or not.
On the basis of the definition of M CP R , Ratha et al. employs the following p hi as a probability that a minutia selected randomly is included in the template:
where K denotes the number of possible minutiae locations. This value p hi indicates a probability that after N p − 1 minutiae fail to match, the N p th minutia matches. Therefore, p hi is the conservative approximation of the probability. As a result, Ratha et al. obtained M CP R as follows:
Computing M CP
Let us consider the condition of N q = N r in M CP R . With regard to this condition, Ratha et al. describes as follows: "Note that brute force attacks with N q excessively large (close to the value K) would be easy to detect and reject out of hand." This claim may be correct when considering not only the security level of the matching algorithm itself but also some additional countermeasures that reduce the strength of the brute-force attack. However, in order to focus on the security level of the algorithm itself as an objective to be evaluated, we should at first discuss M CP without putting any conditions on N q and N r .
To handle with the various values of N q and N r , we will give the exact probability of M CP instead of relying on the approximation used by Ratha et al.
Let us compute M CP instead of M CP R . At first, we obtain probability P N that N (≥ m) of N q minutiae in an input value match with regard to their locations. Then, we obtain probability P N that m of the N minutiae match with regard to their ridge directions. As a result, M CP is expressed as follows:
P N and P N are expressed as follows. (4)- (7). Basically, we employ the following parameters used by Ratha et al.
-The size of an input value S = 300 ×300 pixels. for N q = 40, respectively. It turns out that the attacks using the fingerprints with 400 minutiae extremely gains the attack complexity of about 2 90 in comparison with the attacks using the fingerprints with only 40 minutiae.
Wolf Attack and Wolf Attack Probability
A phenomenon that a special input value causes an extremely high success probability of the false match has been recognized mainly in the field of the speaker recognition [5] . Such an input value is called a wolf. As shown in [1] , it has been common that the wolf means a biometric sample, not a synthesised one.
However, considering the case of input values with 400 minutiae described at the previous section, we should assume that an attacker may successfully find the special input value not only from a group of biometric samples but also from that of non-biometric samples. Moreover, we also have to pay attention to the fact that some biometric authentication systems falsely accept non-biometric samples presented by artifacts [2] . When one wants to evaluate the security of a certain biometric authentication system, we should take it into account that the attacker successfully finds some special input value, "wolf," and may present it by using some artifacts.
We define the wolf as follows.
Definition 3. Let S A be a group of all possible input values including ones taken from artifacts. Let T h be a group of templates taken from all human samples. A wolf is defined as an input value s w ∈ S A such that match(s w , t) = accept for multiple templates t ∈ T h .
We call an input value, s w , is "p-wolf," if the matching probability of the input value s w is given by p = Ave t∈T h P r[match(s w , t) = accept]. Especially, we call 1-wolf a "universal wolf," which falsely matches any templates with probability p = 1.
We also define the wolf attack and the wolf attack probability as follows.
Definition 4. Assume that the following two conditions are satisfied. The one is that the attacker has no information of a biometric sample of a victim to be impersonated. The other is that the attacker has complete information of a matching algorithm in the biometric authentication system to be attacked. The wolf attack is defined as an attempt to impersonate the victim in such a way to present p-wolves with large p's to minimize the complexity of the impersonation attack.

Definition 5. We define the wolf attack probability (W AP ) as follows:
where max Z denotes a maximum of Z.
In the fingerprint-minutiae matching algorithm discussed at the previous section, the attack of presenting the forged fingerprint with 400 minutiae corresponds to the wolf attack. W AP is given as the maximum of M CP where N q = 400 and N r = 40.
Next, we will discuss the lower bound on the number of wolves to be presented in order to make any templates falsely matched under a given W AP . 
Theorem 1. Given a biometric authentication system with wolf attack probability W AP
Proof. Let T wi h be a group of templates falsely matched by s wi for i = 1, 2, . . . , q.
Therefore, q ≥ 1/W AP .
The equality, q = 1/W AP , holds, when the following conditions are satisfied.
Thus, even though the attacker has a set of the wolves that covers all of the templates, the number of attempts required for falsely matches with any templates are lower bounded by 1/W AP . Thus, W AP gives a good security measure for evaluating an individual biometric authentication system against general impersonation attacks considering the existence of wolves.
Is F AR Suitable for the Security Measure regarding the Wolf Attack?
In the previous section, we defined the wolf attack and W AP , and explained why we had to pay attention to them. Then, let us discuss whether or not F AR is suitable for the evaluation of a security level against the wolf attack, instead of W AP . By using the terms of the definition of the wolf attack, we can define F AR as follows.
Definition 6. Let S h (⊂ S A ) be a group of input values taken from all human samples. Let T h be a group of templates taken from all human samples. FAR is defined as the following probability:
Note that F AR is defined by using both biometric samples and templates from S h and T h , respectively. If both S h = S Nq and T h = T Nr hold in the fingerprint-minutiae matching algorithm, F AR is equal to M CP .
With regard to a relationship between F AR and W AP , we can obtain the following lemma.
As discussed later, some biometric authentication system may have strong wolves, and in the extreme case the system may contain a universal wolf, hence W AP = 1 F AR. If only F AR is given as the impersonation measure for a biometric authentication system, such a strong wolf is not explicitly indicated in the specification of the system.
Applying the Wolf Attack to a Finger-Vein-Pattern
Matching Algorithm
We will demonstrate how to search for the wolf and obtain W AP by applying to a finger-vein-pattern matching algorithm proposed by [4] .
Overview of the algorithm to be analyzed
Let us briefly introduce an overview of the algorithm proposed by [4] . A finger vein pattern, which is a binarized image of 240 × 180 pixels, is extracted from an infrared image of the finger. In generating an input value to the matching algorithm from the binarized image, spatial reduction and relabeling of pixels are performed. In the spatial reduction, the binarized image is reduced to one third of its original size in x and y dimensions. In this process, the binarized image is divided into 4, 800 windows of 3 × 3 pixels, and a mean of the grayscale of each window is calculated. The grayscale of each pixel in the reduced image is assigned with the mean.
In the relabeling of the reduced image, which is used as the input value, each pixel in the reduced image is classified into the following three: a vein region, a background region and an ambiguous region. Pixels whose grayscales are between 171 and 255 are labeled as the vein region. Pixels whose grayscales are between 0 and 84 are labeled as the background region. The other pixels are labeled as the umbiguous region. Then, grayscales of pixels in background, ambiguous and vein regions are reassigned with 0, 128 and 255, respectively.
The input value is matched with the corresponding template. The differentiation between the input value and the template is represented by a "mismatch ratio (R m )." R m is defined as follows. 128, 255}, i = 1, 2, . . . , 80, j = 1, 2, . . . , 60}, and (12)
Definition 7. Let an input value and a template be
respectively. 
If R m is equal to or less than the predetermined threshold, the input value is decided to match the template 1 .
Searching a universal wolf
We show that there exists a universal wolf in the finger-vein-pattern matching algorithm as follows.
Lemma 2.
There exists a universal wolf s uw in the finger-vein-pattern matching algorithm [4] .
Proof. In order to prove this lemma, it is sufficient to show one example of s uw that causes R m = 0 for any templates. From the definition of R m , it is clear that if all of pixels in the input value belong to the ambiguous region, R m = 0 holds. Namely, if x i,j = 128 for all (i, j) in s uw , |{x i,j ||x i,j − y i,j | = 255}| = 0 holds because there exists no y i,j such that |128 − y i,j | = 255. Then, the following equation holds for any templates:
Thus, an input value in which all pixels belong to the ambiguous region is one example of s uw .
We put emphasis on that the universal wolf exists in their "matching algorithm" only. Moreover, we add that we have not found a universal wolf for the whole biometric authentication system described in [4] including their probabilistic feature extraction process. In the real evaluation of W AP on an individual biometric authentication system, we need to analyze the feature extraction algorithm altogether.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we proposed the wolf attack and the wolf attack probability (W AP ). We showed that W AP is extremely larger than the success probability which Ratha et al. estimated with regard to the brute-force attack in the fingerprint-minutiae matching algorithm. We also found the universal wolf in the finger-vein-pattern matching algorithm [4] . The universal wolf is an input value that falsely matches any templates for any threshold values.
We have proposed to evaluate the security level against the wolf attack by computing W AP . Assuming that the attacker attempts to impersonate a victim without the knowledge of the victim's biometric sample, W AP gives the lower bound of the security level satisfied by a biometric authentication system.
One of future research topics is to apply the wolf attack to the other matching algorithms. Such research results are useful in comparing the algorithms from the viewpoint of the security against the impersonation attack. Furthermore, one may think of "provable security" in the sense of non-existence of strong p-wolf for any p > k 0 , with some security parameter k 0 . It is an open problem to show a construction of provably-secure biometric authentication systems in the above sense.
